Ghost Code, Lemma Functions More Data Types (lists, trees) Handling Exceptions Computer Arithmetic

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Cours MPRI 2-36-1 "Preuve de Programme"

December 22nd, 2023

Outline

Reminders, Solutions to Exercises

Reminder: Function Calls Reminder: Termination

Reminder: Programs on Arrays

Specification Language and Ghost Code

Ghost code

Ghost Functions

Lemma functions

Modeling Continued: Specifying More Data Types

Sum Types

Lists

Exceptions

Fast WP and SSA

Application: Computer Arithmetic

Handling Machine Integers

Floating-Point Computations



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Function Calls

```
let f(x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) : \tau
requires Pre
writes \vec{w}
ensures Post
body Body
```

$$WP(f(t_1,...,t_n),Q) = Pre[x_i \leftarrow t_i] \land \forall \vec{v}, (Post[x_i \leftarrow t_i, w_j \leftarrow v_j, w_j@Old \leftarrow w_j] \rightarrow Q[w_j \leftarrow v_j])$$

Modular proof

When calling function f, only the contract of f is visible, not its body

Soundness Theorem for a Complete Program

Assuming that for each function defined as

```
let f(x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) : \tau
requires Pre
writes \vec{w}
ensures Post
body Body
```

we have

- ightharpoonup variables assigned in *Body* belong to \vec{w} ,
- ▶ $\models Pre \rightarrow WP(Body, Post)[w_i@Old \leftarrow w_i]$ holds,

then for any formula Q and any expression e, if $\Sigma, \pi \models \mathrm{WP}(e,Q)$ then execution of Σ, π, e is safe

Remark: (mutually) recursive functions are allowed

Termination

- ► Loop *variant*
- Variants for (mutually) recursive function(s)

Home Work: McCarthy's 91 Function

```
f91(n) = \text{if } n \leq 100 \text{ then } f91(f91(n+11)) \text{ else } n-10
```

Find adequate specifications

```
let f91(n:int): int
  requires ?
  variant ?
  writes ?
  ensures ?
body
  if n <= 100 then f91(f91(n + 11)) else n - 10</pre>
```

Use canvas file mccarthy.mlw

Programs on Arrays

- applicative maps as a built-in theory
- array = record (length, pure map)
- handling of out-of-bounds index check

```
type array 'a = { length : int; elts : int -> 'a}
val get (ref a:array 'a) (i:int) : 'a
  requires 0 <= i < a.length
  ensures result = select(a.elts,i)
val set (ref a:array 'a) (i:int) (v:'a) : unit
  requires 0 <= i < a.length
 writes a
  ensures a.length = a@Old.length /\
           a.elts = store(a@Old.elts,i,v)
```

- ▶ a[i] interpreted as a call to get(a,i)
- a[i] <- v interpreted as a call to set(a,i,v)</p>



Home Work: Search Algorithms

```
var a: array int

let search(v:int): int
  requires 0 <= a.length
  ensures { ? }
= ?</pre>
```

- Formalize postcondition: if v occurs in a, between 0 and a.length - 1, then result is an index where v occurs, otherwise result is set to -1
- 2. Implement and prove *linear search*:

```
res \leftarrow -1; for each i from 0 to a.length - 1: if a[i] = v then res \leftarrow i; return res
```

See file lin_search.mlw



Home Work: Binary Search

See file bin search.mlw

```
low = 0; high = a.length - 1;
while low \le high:
let m be the middle of low and high
if a[m] = v then return m
if a[m] < v then continue search between m and high
if a[m] > v then continue search between low and m
```

Syntax: for $i = e_1$ to e_2 do e Typing:

- ▶ *i* visible only in *e*, and is immutable
- $ightharpoonup e_1$ and e_2 must be of type int, e must be of type unit

Operational semantics:

(assuming e_1 and e_2 are values v_1 and v_2)

$$rac{ extstyle V_1 > extstyle V_2}{\sum, \pi, ext{for } i = extstyle V_1 ext{ to } extstyle V_2 ext{ do } extstyle e^{ imes_i} \sum, \pi, ig(ig)$$

$$v_1 \leq v_2$$

$$\Sigma, \pi, \text{ for } i = v_1 \text{ to } v_2 \text{ do } e \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \pi, \quad \text{(let } i = v_1 \text{ in } e\text{)}; \quad \text{(for } i = v_1 + 1 \text{ to } v_2 \text{ do } e\text{)}$$

Propose a Hoare logic rule for the for loop:

$$\frac{\{?\}e\{?\}}{\{?\}\text{for }i=v_1\text{ to }v_2\text{ do }e\{?\}}$$

Propose a rule for computing the WP:

$$\operatorname{WP}(\operatorname{for} i = v_1 \operatorname{to} v_2 \operatorname{invariant} I \operatorname{do} e, Q) = ?$$

Notice: loop invariant / typically has i as a free variable Informal vision of execution, stating when invariant is supposed to hold and for which value of i:

```
\{I[i \leftarrow v1]\}
i \leftarrow v1
{I}
\{I[i \leftarrow i + 1]\}
i \leftarrow i + 1
{I}
\{I[i \leftarrow i + 1]\}
i \leftarrow i + 1
(* assuming now i = v2, last iteration *)
\{I\}(* \text{ where } i = v2 *)
\{I[i \leftarrow i + 1]\}(* and still i=v2, hence *)
\{I[i \leftarrow v2 + 1]\}
                                                  4□ > 4□ > 4□ > 4□ > 4□ > 900
```

So we deduce the Hoare logic rule

$$\frac{\{\textit{I} \land \textit{V}_1 \leq \textit{i} \leq \textit{V}_2\}\textit{e}\{\textit{I}[\textit{i} \leftarrow \textit{i} + 1]\}}{\{\textit{I}[\textit{i} \leftarrow \textit{V}_1] \land \textit{V}_1 \leq \textit{V}_2\} \text{for } \textit{i} = \textit{V}_1 \text{ to } \textit{V}_2 \text{ do } \textit{e}\{\textit{I}[\textit{i} \leftarrow \textit{V}_2 + 1]\}}$$

Remark

Some rule should be stated for case $v_1 > v_2$, left as exercise

and then a rule for computing the WP:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{WP}(\text{for } i = v_1 \text{ to } v_2 \text{ invariant } I \text{ do } e, Q) = \\ v_1 &\leq v_2 \wedge I[i \leftarrow v_1] \wedge \\ \forall \vec{v}, (\\ (\forall i, I \wedge v_1 \leq i \leq v_2 \rightarrow \operatorname{WP}(e, I[i \leftarrow i+1])) \wedge \\ (I[i \leftarrow v_2+1] \rightarrow Q))[w_i \leftarrow v_i] \end{split}$$

Additional exercise: use a for loop in the linear search example



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(Why3) Logic Language (reminder)

- (First-order) logic, built-in arithmetic (integers and reals)
- Definitions à la ML
 - ▶ logic (i.e. pure) *functions*, *predicates*
 - structured types, pattern-matching (to be seen in this lecture)
- type polymorphism à la ML
- higher-order logic as a built-in theory of functions
- Axiomatizations
- Inductive predicates (not detailed here)

Important note

Logic functions and predicates are always totally defined

Example: Euclidean division / just compute the remainder:

```
q <- 0; r <- x;
while r >= y do
  invariant { x = q * y + r }
  r <- r - y; q <- q + 1</pre>
```

Example: Euclidean division / just compute the remainder:

```
r <- x;
while r >= y do
  invariant { exists q. x = q * y + r }
  r <- r - y;
(See Why3 file euclidean_rem.mlw)</pre>
```

Example: Euclidean division / just compute the remainder:

```
q <- 0 ; r <- x;
while r >= y do
   invariant { x = |q| * y + r }
   r <- r - y; |q <- q + 1|</pre>
```

Example: Euclidean division / just compute the remainder:

```
q <- 0; r <- x;
while r >= y do
   invariant { x = q * y + r }
   r <- r - y; q <- q + 1</pre>
```

Ghost code, ghost variables

- Cannot interfere with regular code (checked by typing)
- Visible only in annotations

See also euclidean_rem_with_ghost.mlw

Home Work: Bézout coefficients

Extend the post-condition of Euclid's algorithm for GCD to express the Bézout property:

$$\exists a, b, result = x * a + y * b$$

 Prove the program by adding appropriate ghost local variables

Use canvas file exo_bezout.mlw

More Ghosts: Programs turned into Logic Functions

If the program f is

- Proved terminating
- ► Has no side effects

```
let f(x_1 : \tau_1, \dots, x_n : \tau_n) : \tau
requires Pre
variant var, \prec
ensures Post
body Body
```

then there exists a logic function:

```
function f \tau_1 \ldots \tau_n : \tau
lemma f_{spec} : \forall x_1, \ldots, x_n. \ \textit{Pre} \rightarrow \textit{Post}[\text{result} \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)]
```

and if Body is a pure term then

lemma
$$f_{body}: \forall x_1, \dots, x_n. \ \textit{Pre} \rightarrow f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \textit{Body}$$

Offers an important alternative to axiomatic definitions In Why3: done using keywords let function



Example: axiom-free specification of factorial

```
let function fact (n:int) : int
  requires { n >= 0 }
  variant { n }
= if n=0 then 1 else n * fact(n-1)
```

generates the logic context

```
function fact int : int
axiom f_body: forall n. n >= 0 ->
  fact n = if n=0 then 1 else n * fact(n-1)
```

Example of Factorial

Exercise: Find appropriate precondition, postcondition, loop invariant, and variant, for this program:

```
let fact_imp (x:int): int
  requires ?
  ensures ?
body
  let ref y = 0 in
  let ref res = 1 in
 while y < x do
    y < -y + 1;
    res <- res * y
  done:
  res
```

See file fact.mlw

More Ghosts: Lemma functions

if a program function is without side effects and terminating:

```
let f(x_1:\tau_1,\ldots,x_n:\tau_n): unit requires Pre variant var, \prec ensures Post body Body then it is a proof of \forall x_1,\ldots,x_n.Pre \rightarrow Post
```

▶ If *f* is recursive, it simulates a proof by induction



Example: sum of odds

```
function sum_of_odd_numbers int : int
(** 'sum_of_odd_numbers n' denote the sum of
    odd numbers from '1' to '2n-1' *)
axiom sum of odd numbers base : sum of odd numbers \theta = 0
axiom sum of odd numbers rec : forall n. n \ge 1 - >
  sum_of_odd_numbers n = sum_of_odd_numbers (n-1) + 2*n-1
goal sum_of_odd_numbers_any:
  forall n. n \geq 0 -> sum_of_odd_numbers n = n * n
```

See file arith_lemma_function.mlw

Example: sum of odds as lemma function

```
let rec lemma sum_of_odd_numbers_any (n:int)
  requires { n >= 0 }
  variant { n }
  ensures { sum_of_odd_numbers n = n * n }
  = if n > 0 then sum_of_odd_numbers_any (n-1)
```

Home work

Prove the helper lemmas stated for the fast exponentiation algorithm

See power_int_lemma_functions.mlw

Home Work

Prove Fermat's little theorem for case p = 3:

$$\forall x, \exists y. x^3 - x = 3y$$

using a lemma function

See little_fermat_3.mlw

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Sum Types

► Sum types à la ML:

```
type t = |C_1 \tau_{1,1} \cdots \tau_{1,n_1}|
|C_k \tau_{k,1} \cdots \tau_{k,n_k}|
```

Sum Types

Sum types à la ML:

type t =
$$|C_1 \tau_{1,1} \cdots \tau_{1,n_1}|$$

 $|\vdots$
 $|C_k \tau_{k,1} \cdots \tau_{k,n_k}|$

▶ Pattern-matching with match e with $C_1(p_1, \dots, p_{n_1}) \rightarrow e_1$

$$\mid \vdots \mid C_k(p_1,\cdots,p_{n_k})
ightarrow e_k$$
 end

Sum Types

Sum types à la ML:

```
type t =  | C_1 \tau_{1,1} \cdots \tau_{1,n_1}   | \vdots   | C_k \tau_{k,1} \cdots \tau_{k,n_k}
```

Pattern-matching with

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{match } e \text{ with} \\ \mid C_1(p_1,\cdots,p_{n_1}) \rightarrow e_1 \\ \mid \vdots \\ \mid C_k(p_1,\cdots,p_{n_k}) \rightarrow e_k \\ \text{end} \end{array}$$

Extended pattern-matching, wildcard: _



Recursive Sum Types

- Sum types can be recursive.
- Recursive definitions of functions or predicates
 - Must terminate (only total functions in the logic)
 - In practice in Why3: recursive calls only allowed on structurally smaller arguments.

Sum Types: Example of Lists

```
type list 'a = Nil | Cons 'a (list 'a)
function append(l1:list 'a,l2:list 'a): list 'a =
  match 11 with
  | Nil -> 12
  | Cons(x,l) -> Cons(x, append(l,l2))
  end
function length(l:list 'a): int =
  match l with
  | Nil -> 0
  | Cons(_.r) \rightarrow 1 + length r
  end
function rev(l:list 'a): list 'a =
  match l with
  | Nil -> Nil
  | Cons(x,r) -> append(rev(r), Cons(x,Nil))
  end
```

Example: Efficient List Reversal

Exercise: fill the holes below.

```
val ref l: list int
let rev_append(r:list int)
  variant ? writes ? ensures ?
body
  match r with
  | Nil -> ()
  | Cons(x,r) \rightarrow l \leftarrow Cons(x,l); rev_append(r)
  end
let reverse(r:list int)
  writes l ensures l = rev r
body?
```

See rev.mlw

Binary Trees

```
type tree 'a = Leaf | Node (tree 'a) 'a (tree 'a)
```

Home work: specify, implement, and prove a procedure returning the maximum of a tree of integers.

(problem 2 of the FoVeOOS verification competition in 2011, http://foveoos2011.cost-ic0701.org/verification-competition, continued nowadays as the yearly VerifyThis competition, https://www.pm.inf.ethz.ch/research/verifythis.html)

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Exceptions

We extend the syntax of expressions with

```
e ::= raise exn | try e with exn 	o e
```

with *exn* a set of exception identifiers, declared as **exception** exn **<type>**

Remark: <type> can be omitted if it is unit

Example: linear search revisited in lin_search_exc.mlw

Operational Semantics

- Values (i.e. expressions that do not reduce): now either constants v or raise exn
- Context rules
 Assuming that sub-expressions are introduced with "let",
 e.g. e₁ + e₂ written as

let
$$V_1 = e_1$$
 in let $V_2 = e_2$ in $V_1 + V_2$

then context rules are essentially given by the propagation of thrown exceptions inside "let":

$$\Sigma, \pi, (\text{let } X = \text{raise } exn \text{ in } e) \leadsto \Sigma, \pi, \text{raise } exn$$



Operational Semantics: main rules

Reduction of try-with:

$$\frac{\Sigma, \pi, \textbf{\textit{e}} \leadsto \Sigma', \pi', \textbf{\textit{e}}'}{\Sigma, \pi, (\texttt{try } \textbf{\textit{e}} \, \texttt{with } \, \textbf{\textit{exn}} \rightarrow \textbf{\textit{e}}'') \leadsto \Sigma', \pi', (\texttt{try } \textbf{\textit{e}}' \, \texttt{with } \, \textbf{\textit{exn}} \rightarrow \textbf{\textit{e}}'')}$$

Operational Semantics: main rules

Reduction of try-with:

$$\frac{\Sigma, \pi, \textbf{\textit{e}} \leadsto \Sigma', \pi', \textbf{\textit{e}}'}{\Sigma, \pi, (\texttt{try } \textbf{\textit{e}} \, \texttt{with } \, \textbf{\textit{exn}} \rightarrow \textbf{\textit{e}}'') \leadsto \Sigma', \pi', (\texttt{try } \textbf{\textit{e}}' \, \texttt{with } \, \textbf{\textit{exn}} \rightarrow \textbf{\textit{e}}'')}$$

Normal execution:

$$\Sigma,\pi,(\mathsf{try}\; \mathit{V}\; \mathsf{with}\; \mathit{exn}
ightarrow \mathit{e}') \! \leadsto \! \Sigma,\pi,\mathit{V}$$

Exception handling:

$$\Sigma,\pi,$$
 (try raise *exn* with *exn* \rightarrow *e*) \rightsquigarrow Σ,π,e

$$\frac{exn \neq exn'}{\sum_{n} \pi_{n}(\text{try raise } exn \text{ with } exn' \rightarrow e) \leadsto \sum_{n} \pi_{n} \text{ raise } exn}$$



Function WP modified to allow exceptional post-conditions too:

$$WP(e, Q, exn_i \rightarrow R_i)$$

Implicitly, $R_k = False$ for any $exn_k \notin \{exn_i\}$.

Function WP modified to allow exceptional post-conditions too:

$$WP(e, Q, exn_i \rightarrow R_i)$$

Implicitly, $R_k = False$ for any $exn_k \notin \{exn_i\}$.

Extension of WP for simple expressions:

$$WP(x \leftarrow t, Q, exn_i \rightarrow R_i) = Q[result \leftarrow (), x \leftarrow t]$$

$$\operatorname{WP}(\operatorname{assert} R, Q, \operatorname{\textit{exn}}_i \to R_i) = R \wedge Q$$



Extension of WP for composite expressions:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{WP}(\operatorname{let} x &= e_1 \text{ in } e_2, Q, exn_i \to R_i) = \\ \operatorname{WP}(e_1, \operatorname{WP}(e_2, Q, exn_i \to R_i)[\operatorname{result} \leftarrow x], exn_i \to R_i) \end{split}$$

$$\operatorname{WP}(\operatorname{if} t \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2, Q, exn_i \to R_i) = \\ \operatorname{if} t \text{ then } \operatorname{WP}(e_1, Q, exn_i \to R_i) = \\ \operatorname{else} \operatorname{WP}(e_2, Q, exn_i \to R_i) \end{split}$$

$$\operatorname{WP}\left(\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{while} c \operatorname{invariant} I \\ \operatorname{do} e \end{array}, Q, exn_i \to R_i \right) = I \land \forall \vec{v}, \\ (I \to \operatorname{if} c \text{ then } \operatorname{WP}(e, I, exn_i \to R_i) \text{ else } Q)[w_i \leftarrow v_i] \\ \operatorname{where} w_1, \dots, w_k \text{ is the set of assigned variables in } e \text{ and } v_1, \dots, v_k \text{ are fresh logic variables.} \end{split}$$

Exercise: propose rules for

$$\operatorname{WP}(\operatorname{raise} \mathit{exn}, \mathit{Q}, \mathit{exn}_i \to \mathit{R}_i)$$

and

WP(try
$$e_1$$
 with $exn \rightarrow e_2, Q, exn_i \rightarrow R_i)$

$$egin{aligned} &\operatorname{WP}(\mathsf{raise}\; exn_k, Q, exn_i o R_i) = R_k \ &\operatorname{WP}((\mathsf{try}\; e_1 \; \mathsf{with}\; exn o e_2), Q, exn_i o R_i) = \ &\operatorname{WP}\left(e_1, Q, \left\{ egin{aligned} &exn o \operatorname{WP}(e_2, Q, exn_i o R_i) \\ &exn_i ackslash exn o R_i \end{aligned}
ight) \end{aligned}$$

Functions Throwing Exceptions

Generalized contract:

```
val f(x_1:\tau_1,\ldots,x_n:\tau_n):\tau requires Pre writes \vec{W} ensures Post raises E_1 \rightarrow Post_1 : raises E_n \rightarrow Post_n
```

Extended WP rule for function call:

$$WP(f(t_1,...,t_n), Q, E_k \to R_k) = Pre[x_i \leftarrow t_i] \land \forall \vec{v},$$

$$(Post[x_i \leftarrow t_i, w_j \leftarrow v_j] \to Q[w_j \leftarrow v_j]) \land$$

$$\bigwedge_k (Post_k[x_i \leftarrow t_i, w_j \leftarrow v_j] \to R_k[w_j \leftarrow v_j])$$

Verification Conditions for programs

For each function defined with generalized contract

```
let f(x_1:\tau_1,\ldots,x_n:\tau_n):\tau requires Pre writes \vec{W} ensures Post raises E_1 \rightarrow Post_1 : raises E_n \rightarrow Post_n body Body
```

we have to check

- ▶ Variables assigned in *Body* belong to \vec{w}
- ▶ $Pre \rightarrow WP(Body, Post, E_k \rightarrow Post_k)[w_i@Old \leftarrow w_i]$ holds

Example: "Defensive" variant of ISQRT

```
exception NotSquare
let isgrt(x:int): int
  ensures result >= 0 / \sqrt{sqr(result)} = x
  raises NotSquare -> forall n:int. sqr(n) <> x
body
  if x < 0 then raise NotSquare;</pre>
  let ref res = 0 in
  let ref sum = 1 in
  while sum <= x do
    res <- res + 1; sum <- sum + 2 * res + 1
  done;
  if sgr(res) <> x then raise NotSquare;
  res
```

See Why3 version in isqrt_exc.mlw

Home Work

Implement and prove binary search using also a immediate exit:

```
low = 0; high = a.length - 1;
while low \le high:
let m be the middle of low and high
if a[m] = v then return m
if a[m] < v then continue search between m and high
if a[m] > v then continue search between low and m
(see bin_search_exc.mlw)
```

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```
val a : int
let f (): int
  requires a > 0
  ensures a > 100
body
  if 50 < a then
   a < -a + 50
 else
   a < -a + 100
end
```

```
val a : int
let f (): int
   requires a > 0
   ensures a > 100
body
  if 50 < a then
    a <- a + 50
 else
    a < -a + 100
end
```

```
let f (): int
    requires a0 > 0
    ensures a3 > 100
body
    if 50 < a0 then
        a3 := a0 + 50
    else
        a3 := a0 + 100
end</pre>
```

```
val a : int
let f (): int
   requires a > 0
   ensures a > 100
body
  if 50 < a then
    a <- a + 50
 else
    a < -a + 100
end
```

```
val a : int
let f (): int
   requires a > 0
   ensures a > 100
body
  if 50 < a then
    a <- a + 50
 else
    a < -a + 100
end
```

```
val a : int
let f (): int
   requires a > 0
   ensures a > 100
body
  if 50 < a then
    a < -a + 50
  else
    a <- a + 100
end
```

$$\forall a0, a1, a2, a3.$$
 $a0 > 0 \implies$
 $a1 = a0 + 50 \implies$
 $a2 = a0 + 100 \implies$
 $a3 = ite(50 < a0, a1, a2) \implies$
 $a3 > 100$

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Computers and Number Representations

- 32-, 64-bit signed integers in two-complement: may overflow
 - ightharpoonup 2147483647 + 1 ightharpoonup -2147483648
 - ightharpoonup 100000 $^2 o 1410065408$

Computers and Number Representations

- 32-, 64-bit signed integers in two-complement: may overflow
 - ightharpoonup 2147483647 + 1 ightharpoonup -2147483648
 - ightharpoonup 1000002 ightharpoonup 1410065408
- floating-point numbers (32-, 64-bit):
 - overflows
 - $2 \times 2 \times \cdots \times 2 \rightarrow +inf$
 - $-1/0 \rightarrow -inf$
 - $\,\blacktriangleright\,\,0/0\to \text{NaN}$

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- 32-, 64-bit signed integers in two-complement: may overflow
 - ightharpoonup 2147483647 + 1 ightharpoonup -2147483648
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- ► floating-point numbers (32-, 64-bit):
 - overflows
 - \triangleright 2 × 2 × · · · × 2 \rightarrow + inf
 - $-1/0 \rightarrow -inf$
 - ightharpoonup 0/0
 ightarrow NaN
 - rounding errors
 - $\underbrace{0.1 + 0.1 + \dots + 0.1}_{10 \textit{times}} = 1.0 \rightarrow \text{false}$ (because $0.1 \rightarrow 0.100000001490116119384765625$ in 32-bit)

See also arith.c

▶ 1991, during Gulf War 1, a Patriot system fails to intercept a Scud missile: 28 casualties.

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Internal clock ticks every 0.1 second. Time is tracked by fixed-point arith.: 0.1 \simeq 209715 \cdot 2⁻²⁴. Cumulated skew after 24h: -0.08s, distance: 160m. System was supposed to be rebooted periodically.

▶ 2007, Excel displays 77.1 × 850 as 100000.

Bug in binary/decimal conversion.

Failing inputs: 12 FP numbers.

Probability to uncover them by random testing: 10^{-18} .

77.1 * 850 = 655350

Integer overflow: example of Binary Search

Google "Read All About It: Nearly All Binary Searches and Mergesorts are Broken"

```
let ref l = 0 in
let ref u = a.length - 1 in
while l <= u do
   let m = (l + u) / 2 in
   ...</pre>
```

I + u may overflow with large arrays!

Goal

prove that a program is safe with respect to overflows

Target Type: int32

- ▶ 32-bit signed integers in two-complement representation: integers between -2³¹ and 2³¹ - 1.
- ► If the mathematical result of an operation fits in that range, that is the computed result.
- Otherwise, an overflow occurs. Behavior depends on language and environment: modulo arith, saturated arith, abrupt termination, etc.

A program is safe if no overflow occurs.

Safety Checking

Idea: replace all arithmetic operations by abstract functions with preconditions. x + y becomes int32_add(x, y).

```
val int32_add(x: int, y: int): int
requires -2^31 <= x + y < 2^31
ensures result = x + y</pre>
```

Unsatisfactory: range contraints of integer must be added explicitly everywhere

Safety Checking, Second Attempt

Idea:

- replace type int with an abstract type int32
- ▶ introduce a *projection* from *int*32 to *int*
- axiom about the range of projections of int32 elements
- replace all operations by abstract functions with preconditions

```
type int32
function to_int(x: int32): int
axiom bounded_int32:
  forall x: int32. -2^31 <= to_int(x) < 2^31

val int32_add(x: int32, y: int32): int32
  requires -2^31 <= to_int(x) + to_int(y) < 2^31
  ensures to_int(result) = to_int(x) + to_int(y)</pre>
```

Binary Search with overflow checking

See bin_search_int32.mlw

Binary Search with overflow checking

See bin_search_int32.mlw

Application

Used for translating mainstream programming language into Why3:

- From C to Why3: Frama-C, Jessie plug-in See bin_search.c
- From Java to Why3: Krakatoa
- From Ada to Why3: Spark2014
- From Rust to Why3: Creusot

Floating-Point Arithmetic

- ▶ Limited range ⇒ exceptional behaviors.
- ► Limited precision ⇒ inaccurate results.

- ightharpoonup 77.1 * 850 = 655350 in \mathcal{R}
- ► 65534.9999999999927 in FP
- with printf "%f" printed as 655350.00000
- different from the FP 655350.00000

Floating-Point Data

IEEE-754 Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic.

Width: $1 + w_e + w_m = 32$, or 64, or 128.

Bias: $2^{w_e-1} - 1$. Precision: $p = w_m + 1$.

A floating-point datum

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A floating-point datum

sign $s \mid \text{biased exponent } e' (w_e \text{ bits}) \mid \text{mantissa } m (w_m \text{ bits})$ represents

- if $0 < e' < 2^{w_e} 1$, the real $(-1)^s \cdot \overline{1.m'} \cdot 2^{e'-bias}$, normal
- if e' = 0.
 - ± 0 if m' = 0.
 - zeros ▶ the real $(-1)^s \cdot \overline{0.m'} \cdot 2^{-bias+1}$ otherwise. subnormal
- ightharpoonup if $e' = 2^{w_e} 1$.
 - $(-1)^s \cdot \infty$ if m' = 0,
 - Not-a-Number otherwise.

infinity

Floating-Point Data

On the real line



Subnormal number in blue:




Semantics for the Finite Case

IEEE-754 standard

A floating-point operator shall behave as if it was first computing the infinitely-precise value and then rounding it so that it fits in the destination floating-point format.

Rounding of a real number *x*:



Overflows are not considered when defining rounding: exponents are supposed to have no upper bound!



Specifications, main ideas

Same as with integers, we specify FP operations so that no overflow occurs.

```
constant max : real = 0x1.FFFFFEp127
predicate in_float32 (x:real) = abs x <= max</pre>
type float32
function to_real(x: float32): real
axiom float32_range: forall x: float32. in_float32 (to_real x)
function round32(x: real): real
(* ... axioms about round32 ... *)
function float32_add(x: float32, y: float32): float32
  requires in_float32(round32(to_real x + to_real y))
  ensures to_real result = round32 (to_real x + to_real y)
```

Specifications in practice

- Several possible rounding modes
- many axioms for round32, but incomplete anyway
- Specialized prover: Gappa http://gappa.gforge.inria.fr/

Demo: clock_drift.c

Deductive verification nowadays

More native support in SMT solvers:

- bitvectors supported by CVC4, Z3, others
- theory of floats supported by Z3, CVC4, MathSAT

Using such a support for deductive program verification remains an open research topic

Issues when bitvectors/floats are mixed with other features: conversions, arrays, quantification

Fumex et al.(2016) C. Fumex, C. Dross, J. Gerlach, C. Marché. Specification and proof of high-level functional properties of bit-level programs. 8th NASA Formal Methods Symposium, LNCS 9690 Science

Boldo, Marché (2011) S. Boldo, C. Marché. Formal verification of numerical programs: from C annotated programs to mechanical proofs. Mathematics in Computer Science, 5:377–393